SCHWALBE v. JONES: THE OWNER-PASSENGER
STATUTE HELD CONSTITUTIONAL--WHAT EVER
HAPPENED TO BROWN v. MERLO?
Everyone [in California] is responsible . . . for any injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person. .... 1
Automobile owners beware: You are not protected by this duty
of ordinary care and skill. The next time you allow a friend to
drive, remember that his only responsibility toward you as a
passenger is to refrain from willful misconduct or intoxication.

INTRODUCTION
California Vehicle Code § 171582 requires an automobile owner
who is injured while riding as a passenger in his own car to prove
as a condition to any recovery that his injuries resulted from the
driver's intoxication or willful misconduct. In Schwalbe v. Jones,3
decided on March 12, 1976, the California Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of this statute and denied an owner-passenger
the right to recover from a negligent driver. Only three years
earlier, in Brown v. Merlo,4 the same court had unanimously declared the automobile guest statute unconstitutional, at least as
applied to the nonowner-passenger. The Schwalbe decision not
only undercuts Brown but also is inconsistent with previous developments in California tort law.
This Comment will demonstrate that no rationale exists to
support differential treatment of an owner-passenger and a non1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
2. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West Supp. 1976) provides:

No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and
driven by another person with his permission has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle or against
any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver on
account of personal injury to or the death of the owner during
the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the
injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
[This statute is hereinafter referred to as the owner-passenger statute.]
3. 16 Cal. 3d 514, 546 P.2d 1033, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976).
4. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
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owner-passenger. An analysis of the Schwalbe decision will underscore the inconsistency of its rationale. If Schwalbe had been
decided on its facts, the court could have avoided entirely the issue
of the owner-passenger statute's constitutionality. In addition, the
rationale suggested by the majority does not support the legislative
purposes of the Vehicle Code financial responsibility 5 and civil
liability 6 provisions. Finally, Schwalbe must be viewed within the
context of California tort law, which is based on the fault principle
and on the policy of fair compensation to injured plaintiffs. However, to understand the impact of Schwalbe, an examination of the
guest statute's background and of Brown is required.
BACKGROUND

Guest Statutes
The first guest statutes were enacted in 19277 during a transitional period in American history in which the automobile had
become the prevalent mode of transportation.8 Courts have interpreted the purpose of guest statutes as twofold. First, guest
statutes purportedly protect generous hosts who offer their hospitality to nonpaying guests; 9 second, they prevent collusion be5. CAL. VEHI. CODE §§ 16000-480 (West Supp. 1976).
6. Id. §§ 17150-154.
7. Connecticut, 1927 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 328, § 1 (repealed 1937), and
Iowa, 1937 Iowa Acts, ch. 134, § 512, were the first states to pass guest stat-

utes.
8. At common law the driver was held to a reasonable standard of care
in the operation of his automobile. There was no discrimination against
the gratuitous guest's recovery for injuries resulting from the host's negligence. The guest statutes were passed in the late 1920's and early 1930's
at a time when the automobile was gaining increased popularity as a form
of transportation. At that time automobile liability insurance was almost
non-existent. However, the automobile had not become the necessity that
it is today. See Tipton, Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L.
REV. 287, 288 (1958); Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 660-63 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Maloy v. Taylor, 86 Ariz. 356, 360, 346 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1961);
Colombo v. Sech, 52 Del. 575, 577, 163 A.2d 270, 272 (1961); Davidson v.
Pugh, 1 Ill. App. 670, 675, 274 N.E.2d 205, 208 (1971); Anderson v. City of
Council Bluffs, 195 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Iowa 1972); Rainsbarger v. Shepard,
254 Iowa 486, 492, 118 N.W.2d 41, 42 (1962); Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa
958, 962, 90 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1958); Steenson v. Robinson, 236 Or. 414, 42324, 389 P.2d 27, 29 (1964).
In California, see, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 253,

tween the driver and the passenger. 10 These statutes usually
require a duty of minimum care by the driver toward his nonpaying guest.1 Generally, absent compensation 2 from the passenger, the driver need refrain only from reckless, wanton, or willful
13
misconduct.
California adopted its first guest statute in 1929.14 Although
amended in 1931,15 the statute remained unclear about whether
288 P.2d 868, 872 (1955); Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 242, 143 P.2d
704, 706 (1943); Sand v. Mahnan, 248 Cal. App. 2d 679, 683, 56 Cal. Rptr.
691, 696 (1967); Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 230, 45 Cal. Rptr.
124, 125 (1965); Bowman v. Collins, 181 Cal. App. 2d 807, 814, 5 Cal. Rptr.
776, 780 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Truitt v. Gains, 199 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1961); Rodgers
v. Lawrence, 227 Ark. 117, 121, 296 S.W.2d 899, 902 (1956); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 7 Misc. 2d 1057, 1068, 165 N.Y.S.2d 395, 406 (1957); Birmelin v. Gist,
162 Ohio St. 98, 108, 120 N.E.2d 711, 717 (1954).
In California, see, e.g., Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 230, 45
Cal. Rptr. 124, 125 (1965); Sand v. Mahnan, 248 Cal. App. 2d 679, 683, 56
Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (1967). According to some commentators, this purpose
was heavily emphasized by insurance company lobbyists. See W. PRossER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 187 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]; Georgetta, The Major Issues in a Guest Case, 1954 INS.
L.J. 583, 583; White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-paying
Passenger,20 VA. L. Rsv. 326, 332-33 (1934).
As one commentator succinctly noted: "Of course in seeking such statutes
the insurance companies usually were represented by well-organized, wellfinanced and effective lobbyists, while the unorganized and unknown injured persons of the future had no lobbies or agents at all." Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. Rsv. 287, 288 (1958).
11. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.15, at 950-51 (1956);
PNossEn, supra note 10, at § 60, at 382-85. A person who is a passenger
for the mutual benefit of himself and the owner is not a guest. E.g.,
Hertz Rental Co. v. Pitts, 174 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1965); Tillman v. McLeod, 124 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. 1962); Reeves v. Beckman, 256 Iowa 263,
267, 127 N.W.2d 95, 97 (1964). However, the benefit conferred must be sufficiently real and tangible. Remote or inconsequential benefits are not sufficient. E.g., Brown v. Killinger, 146 So. 2d 124, 128 (Fla. 1962); Tillman
v. Mcleod, 124 So. 2d 135, 136-37 (Fla. 1962).
12. Some statutes use the term payment instead of compensation. E.g.,
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Baldwin 1976). Some courts construe payment as referring only to the exchange of tangible property such as money,
whereas compensation is a broader term which encompasses the rendering
of personal services, Georgetta, The Major Issues in a Guest Case, 1954 INs.
L.J. 5S3, 585.
13. There is an apparent trend to interpret words such as reckless and
wanton as setting forth objective standards of fault that are different in

kind, not just degree, from negligence. V.
GENCE § 10.3, at 182 (1974).

ScHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-

14. Act of Aug. 14, 1929, ch. 787, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stats. 1580 (repealed 1973).
15. Act of Aug. 14, 1931 ch. 812, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stats. 1693. The statute
was amended by eliminating gross negligence as a basis for liability, making it necessary that a guest prove willful misconduct on the part of the
driver. The test for willful misconduct is that the driver must have actual
knowledge of the danger involved in doing or failing to do the act, coupled

[VOL. 14: 904, 1977]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

an owner could be a "guest." In 1961 the owner-passenger portion
was appended to the guest statute 16 to settle the issue of the
owner's status while riding as a passenger in his own car. This
amendment provided that an owner riding as a passenger in his
own automobile was barred from recovery for injuries caused by
of willful misconduct or intoxication on
the driver, absent proof
17
the part of the driver.
Throughout their undistinguished history, guest statutes have
9
been attacked by commentators 18 and challenged in the courts.'
with a failure to attempt to avert the injury. See Howard v. Howard, 132

Cal. App. 124, 22 P.2d 279 (1933), in which the issue of the amendment's
effect was raised for the first time.

16. The California guest statute previously provided:
No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and
driven by another person with his permission and no person who
as a guest accepts a ride in any. vehicle upon a highway without
giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person, has any
right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle
or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner
or guest during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action
establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from the
intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
Act of July 12, 1961, ch. 1600, § 1, 1961 Cal. Stats. 3428 (repealed 1973).
17. Act of July 12, 1961, ch. 1600, § 1, 1961 Cal. Stats. 3429 (current version
at CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West Supp. 1976)). The 1961 amendment included as guests owners who gave compensation. See Patton v. La Bree,
60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d 398, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1963). By furnishing the
automobile, the owner is almost automatically furnishing compensation by
contributing the rental value of the automobile to the cost of the ride. Lorch
v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 319, 85 A.2d 841, 843 (1952). See also Degenstein v.
Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1966); Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114
S.E.2d 732 (1960).
18. E.g., PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 34, at 186-87; Gibson, Guest Passenger Discrimination,6 ALBERTA L. REV. 211 (1968); Lascher, Hard Laws Make
Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1 (1968); Morgan, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 321 (1966); Mundt, The South Dakota Automobile Guest
Statute, 2 S.D. L. REv. 70 (1957); Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 90 (1961); Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287 (1958); White, The
Liability of an Automobile-Driver to a Nonpaying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REV.
326; Note, Problems of Recovery under the Iowa Guest Statute, 47 IoWA L.
REV. 1049 (1962); Comment, The Illinois Guest Statute: An Analysis &
Reappraisal,54 Nw. U. L. REV. 263 (1959).
19. E.g., Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960) (challenged on grounds that special privileges and immunities had been granted
to a small class of people); Hazzard v. Alexander, 36 Del. 212, 173 A. 517
(1934) (challenged on grounds that a vested right is infringed); Delaney

However, until Brown no court had been bold enough to hold a
guest statute unconstitutional. 20 The Brown court, dealing only
with a nonowner guest under the guest statute, left unresolved the
21
question of the owner-passenger statute's constitutionality.
The Rationale of Brown v. Merlo
The court in Brown adopted a novel approach 22 in holding that
v. Badame, 49 Ill. 2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971)

(challenged on grounds

of denial of due process); Westover v. Schaffer, 205 Kan. 62, 468 P.2d 251

(1970); and Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932)

(on

grounds of denial of a remedy at law for injuries received); Naudzius v.
Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931) (on grounds of denial of due process and insufficiency of title).
20. The constitutionality of the California guest statute was first discussed in Forsman v. Colton, 136 Cal. App. 97, 28 P.2d 429 (1933). There
the court said in dictum that the statute was constitutional. In Patton v.
La Bree, 60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d 398, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1963), the constitutionality issue was raised; however, the issue of the case revolved around
the 1961 owner-passenger provision, which was held constitutional. In Ferreria v. Barham, 230 Cal. App. 2d 128, 40 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1964), the court
conceded that Forsman may have been defective in its holding that the
guest statute was constitutional. Nevertheless, the Ferreriacourt held that
Forsman was correct in light of Patton, which had refused to accent an argument that the statute was unconstitutional. Finally, in Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965), the court cited Ferreria
as demonstration of the guest statute's constitutionality.
21. 8 Cal. 3d at 862 n.3, 506 P.2d at 217 n.3, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.3.
22. Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
does not require absolute equality, state action may not impose special burdens on selected groups except in pursuit of a legitimate state purpose.
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966). Recently, constitutional scrutiny of a statutory classification under the equal protection clause has been
based in general on one of two standards. (1) A strict scrutiny test is used
when the classification involves either a suspect class or a fundamental
right. Suspect classes include those based on illegitimacy (Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 1-64 (1972)); race (McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964)); alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1970)); and
sex (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972)). Fundamental rights include voting (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)) and interstate travel
(Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972)). When strict
scrutiny is employed, the state must show that its classification scheme is
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. (2) When interests involved are not fundamental and the classifications are not suspect, the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the state's prerogative and upheld
state action under a rational basis test. This test is whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); North Dakota Bd. Pharmacy v. Snyder Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The state is presumed
to have acted within its constitutional power.
Before Brown the California Supreme Court had utilized the two-tier
analysis in reviewing classifications. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
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the California guest statute violated the equal protection clause of
the California" and United States 24 Constitutions. The Brown
court reasoned that the classification of automobile guest did not
bear a substantial and rational relationship to the guest statute's
purpose. 25 After noting the purpose of the guest statute, the
court considered whether the statute's classification either included
individuals irrelevant to the statutory purpose or excluded those
26
relevant to that purpose.

In Brown, the court found no reasonable ground for a distinction between automobile guests and other guests. The court
directly assailed the dual purpose of the guest statute. First, no
rational basis was found for removing a guest's protection from
27
negligently inflicted injuries because of the host's generosity.

The validity of characterizing the basis of the injured guest's
lawsuit as ingratitude has been eliminated by the development of
automobile insurance coverage.2 8 Although a guest does not sue
the host's insurance company directly, the insurance company ultimately pays the judgment against the host. In addition, the promotion of hospitality does not rationally justify reduced protection
for the class of automobile guests, 29 especially when other types of
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473

P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471
P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970). Although the Brown court did not apply
strict scrutiny, it did require more than just a rational relationship between
the classification and the legislative purpose.

23. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 11 states: "All laws of general nature shall have
uniform operation."
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall.

. .

deprive any person ...

within its jurisdic-

tion the equal protection of the laws."
25. 8 Cal. 3d at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
26. This approach determines whether the classification scheme promotes
the actual legislative purpose. The United States Supreme Court has
moved toward this approach in some cases. E.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972) (recoupment of indigent defendant's defense costs); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (commitment of incompetent criminal defendants); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 645 (1972) (disadvantaged
illegitimates); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (gender classification); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 505 U.S. 438 (1972) (restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives).

27. 8 Cal. 3d at 866-67, 506 P.2d at 220, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
28. Id. at 867-68, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
29. Id. at 869, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398.

guests in California are afforded protection against unreasonable
30
conduct.
Second, the Brown court examined the collusion-prevention purpose to determine whether this purpose justified excluding all suits
against a negligent host. Guest statute supporters had maintained
that the injured guest and defendant driver could make an agreement that the defendant would testify that he was negligent. According to such a fraudulent scheme, the injured guest and defendant would then split the proceeds awarded to the guest, usually at
the defendant's car insurer's expense. However, the Brown court
focused on previous judicial decisions which had ignored collusionbased arguments and had granted recovery to injured plaintiffs.8 1
From this review, the court reasoned that eliminating a cause of
action by an entire class of people because an undefined portion of
that class may file fraudulent claims was unreasonable. Moreover,
the passenger and driver can escape the guest statute's bar by collusive testimony concerning whether the passenger provided any
compensation for the ride.3 2 The court concluded that the classification of automobile guest included honest individuals irrelevant
to the statute's collusion-prevention purpose.
Finally, the court in Brown condemned the guest statute for the
many loopholes which result from treating certain automobile
guests differently from others. The court noted three statutory
criteria which affect the treatment of automobile guests. For a
guest to come under the statute, the injuries must occur "during
the ride," "in any vehicle," and "upon the highway." The court
concluded that none of these criteria bears any relationship to the
legislative purposes behind the guest statute,3 3 for the distinctions
neither protect generous hosts nor prevent collusive schemes.
Brown was the first decision in the United States to hold a guest
statute unconstitutional. Many other jurisdictions have followed
30. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1968), which held that the occupier of land owes an invitee onto his
land a duty of reasonable care. See also Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356,
232 P.2d 241 (1951), and Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97
P.2d 798 (1939), in which the court held that the charitable organizations
involved were liable for their negligent conduct regardless of the fact that
they did not charge for their services.
31. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971) (rejecting parental immunity); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376
P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (rejecting inter-spousal immunity); Emery
v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (rejecting intra-family immunity).
32. 8 Cal. 3d at 875-76, 506 P.2d at 226-27, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
33. Id. at 879-80, 506 P.2d at 229-30, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 405-06.
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Brown's rationale. 34

These jurisdictions, too, have become convinced that "the time [has] come to bulldoze under the whole garden of the Guest Act and use it to mulch a new era of law and
reason."36
Subsequent to Brown, the California legislature revoked the
guest portion of Vehicle Code section 17158.36 However, the owner37
passenger portion of Vehicle Code section 17158 was reenacted.
SCHWALBE V. JONES
The Background

Patricia Schwalbe Jones and Thomas Jones decided to tow her
inoperable Renault to Saratoga, California, in order to give the car
to a friend. Patricia and Thomas tied the Renault to Patricia's
Triumph with a nylon towline, and she decided to ride in the towed
car as a passenger and let a friend, Albert Pohl, steer the Renault.
Thomas drove the Triumph. The two cars were on the freeway
when the towed Renault swerved violently and the towline broke.
The Renault went off the freeway and overturned. Its driver escaped unharmed, but Patricia was fatally injured.
Patricia's parents brought a wrongful death action against
Thomas, alleging negligence and willful misconduct. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit on the negligence
count at the end of the plaintiff's case on the ground that the
owner-passenger statute precluded recovery. Subsequently, the
34. E.g., Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1326 (1974); Henry
v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 326 (1974); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v.
McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88
N. Mex. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.
1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975). Contra,
White v. Hughs, 257 Ark. 627, 915 S.W.2d 70 (1975); Richardson v.
Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d 536 (1974); Justive v. Gatchelli, 325
A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa
1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Or. 252, 525 P.2d 99 (1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883
(Utah 1974).
35. Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California
Guest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 3 (1968).
36. The legislature also revoked the guest portion of the airplane guest
statute. Act of Apr. 8, 1953, ch. 151, § 1, 1953 Cal. Stats. 934 (current version at CAL. PUB. UTIL. ConE § 21404 (West Supp. 1976)) and repealed the
entire motorboat guest statute (Act of July 19, 1961, ch. 2132, § 3, 1960 Cal.
Stats. 4398 (repealed Act of Sept. 25, 1973, ch. 803, § 1, 1973 Cal. Stats. 1425).
37. CAL. VH. CODE § 17158 (West Supp. 1976).

jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on the willful
claiming
misconduct count. The plaintiffs appealed the judgement,
38
that the owner-passenger statute was unconstitutional.
On April 16, 1975, in a 4-3 decision, 30 the California Supreme
Court reversed and remanded Schwalbe, holding the owner-passenger statute unconstitutional. 40 The court reasoned that the mere
fact of ownership may no more deprive one of a negligence claim
than may the status of an automobile guest.41 Moreover, the
owner-passenger provision did not reasonably relate to either of
the legislative goals, which the court defined as promoting hospitality and preventing collusion. 4 2 On rehearing, 43 however, the
38. The first District Court of Appeal, Division Three, first heard the ap-

peal. Schwalbe v. Jones (opinion omitted), 110 Cal. Rptr. 563 (Nov. 9,
1973). The court in a short opinion relied on Patton v. La Bree, 60 Cal.
2d 606, 387 P.2d 398, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1963), which held the 1961 ownerpassenger provision constitutional. The narrow issue in Patton, however,
was whether denying recovery to an owner riding as a passenger who gave
compensation is discrimination against the owner since a nonowner-guest
who gives compensation may recover.
39. Justice Tobriner wrote the majority opinion in which Justices McComb, Mosk, and Burke concurred. Justice Burke was a retired associate
justice of the California Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the
chairman of the Judicial Council. Justice Sullivan wrote the dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Wright and Justice Clark concurred. When
the case was reheard, the majority consisted of Chief Justice Wright, Justices Sullivan, Clark, McComb, and Richardson (the latter had recently been
appointed to the court). Justices Tobriner and Mosk dissented.
40. 14 Cal. 3d 148 (opinion omitted), 534 P.2d 73, 120 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Apr.
16, 1975).

41. The court stated in a footnote that because the accident occurred in

1967, the technically applicable version of section 17158 was the one in effect when Brown was decided. However, the court said that it would apply
the current statute, for the language of the former version is essentially the

same as that of the present. Id., 534 P.2d at 74 n.3, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 586
n.3.

42. Id., 534 P.2d at 74, 120 Cal. Rptr. 586.

The court reasoned that

the hospitality purpose was inapplicable because eliminating claims by the
owner-passenger may deter rather than encourage hospitality. The car
owner often may be less, not more, inclined to invite another to drive. Id.,
534 P.2d at 75, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 587. Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the collusion-prevention purpose failed because no more danger of
collusion existed between an owner-occupant and driver than between
a nonowner-occupant and driver, id., 534 P.2d at 75, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
The defendant, however, distinguished the owner-passenger statute from
the guest statute in three ways. (1) The owner-passenger's ability to control and direct the driver is greater. (2) The owner-passenger provision
was designed to protect the uninsured guest driver for exclusionary clauses
in auto liability insurance policies exclude the policy holder from recovery
on his own policy. (3) Finally, the owner-passenger statute was designed
to encourage the owners' use of due care in selecting those to whom they
will entrust their vehicles. Id., 534 P.2d at 76-77, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
43. Id., petition for rehearinggranted, S.F. No. 23072, Cal. Sup. Ct. (June
11, 1975).
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court reversed its earlier decision and found the owner-passenger
statute constitutional, thus denying recovery to Patricia Schwalbe
Jones' parents.
The Schwalbe Holding
Justice Sullivan, who wrote the majority opinion in Schwalbe,
first distinguished Brown by rejecting the equal protection analysis
used in that case as "diluting the traditional standard of equal protection analysis [-a
dilution which] would result in the substitution of judicial policy determination for established constitutional
principle." 44 Rather, the Schwalbe court applied a more traditional approach and analyzed whether the classification bears a
rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose. 45 Justice
Sullivan further distinguished Brown by reasoning that different
legislative purposes sustain the owner-passenger statute than supported the original guest statute. This reasoning refuted the dissenters' contention that the hospitality and collusion rationales did
46
not support the owner-passenger statute in light of Brown.
Justice Sullivan found two distinctions between owner-passengers
and nonowner-passengers. First, the reenacting of the ownerpassenger statute after the Brown decision occurred with Insurance
Code section 11580.1-7 in mind, which allows insurance companies
to exclude "the named insured" from recovering on his own liability insurance policy.48 Sullivan concluded that the owner-pas44. 16 Cal. 3d at 518-19 n.2, 546 P.2d at 1035 n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24
n.2.
45. Id. at 518, 546 P.2d at 1038, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
46. Id. at 532, 546 P.2d 1045, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Tobriner, is similar to the majority opinion in the
first hearing of Schwalbe. See note 42 supra.
47. 16 Cal. 3d at 520, 546 P.2d at 1037-38, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
48. California decisions indicate that an automobile liability policy will
be construed to protect an additional insured (a driver driving with the
owner's permission) against a claim for injuries by a named insured
(owner-passenger) unless such protection is expressly and unambiguously
excluded. See, e.g., Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d 100,
416 P.2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1966); Bachman v. Independent Indem. Co.,
214 Cal. 529, 6 P.2d 943 (1931); P.E. O'Hair & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 267
Cal. App. 2d 195, 72 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1968). A good example of this construction is State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193, 514 P.2d
953, 110 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973). This case dealt with three different situations
in which the owner of an automobile, while riding as a passenger in his

senger statute was reenacted to protect the nonowner driver. He
reasoned that because the owner was precluded from recovery under his own policy, the owner would seek redress against the driver.4 9 Furthermore, the owner may not recover on his liability
policy for injuries sustained as a result of his negligent driving.
Consequently, to allow the owner to recover from the driver while
the owner is riding as a passenger would be unfair, for the owner
is able to choose and supervise the driver.50 Justice Sullivan's
second distinction between owner-passengers and nonowner-passengers concerned the former's greater ability to control the driver.Y'
Insurance Code Section 11580.1 as a Rationale
Two pivotal concerns in Justice Sullivan's reasoning were the
amendment to Insurance Code section 11580.152 and the legislature's intent to protect the nonowner-driver. The owner-passenger
statute does not further this purpose and raises the question of
whether the legislature had Insurance Code section 11580.1 in mind
own car, was either injured or killed in an accident caused by the drivers'
negligence. All policies involved excluded the named insured from recovery for injuries sustained. However, the policies were "to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of (a) bodily injury sustained by other persons."
The court held that the owner-passengers were covered because as passengers they were "other persons." The court reasoned that the exclusionary
clause may reasonably be interpreted as referring only to injuries sustained
by the party facing liability for an alleged misuse of the vehicle-the party
who seeks a legal defense. Id. at 203, 514 P.2d at 959, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
7. But see Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Geyer, 247 Cal. App. 2d 625, 55 Cal. Rptr.
861 (1967). See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Frederick, 244 Cal. App. 2d 776.
53 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1966).
49. 16 Cal. 3d at 522, 546 P.2d at 1038, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
50. Id.
51. Justice Sullivan relied on Patton v. La Bree, 60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d
398, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1963), for this distinction. In Patton the court
focused on the greater ability of the owner-passenger to control and direct
his driver. Furthermore, the court reasoned, the legislature may have taken
into account the different relationship between a nonowner and ownerpassenger and the driver, id. at 609, 387 P.2d at 400, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
52. This section was added in 1970. Act of July 3, 1970, ch. 300, § 4, 1970
Cal. Stats. 573. The applicable part provides:
(c)In addition to any exclusion as provided in paragraph (3) of
subdivision (b), the insurance afforded by any such policy of
automobile liability insurance to which subdivision (a) applies may,
by appropriate policy provision, be made inapplicable to any or all
the following:
(5) Liability for bodily injury to an insured.
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when it reenacted the owner-passenger statute. The owner-passenger statute's protection does not coincide with the exclusions permitted by Insurance Code section 11580.1. Rather, it provides
protection for the driver only when the owner is "riding in or
occupying" the vehicle and when injuries occur "during the ride."
Similarly, the statute extends only to situations in which the owner
is the injured party.53 On the one hand, the driver owes any nonowner-passenger a duty of reasonable care. On the other hand,
section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code permits automobile liability
insurance policies to exclude liability coverage for bodily injury to
an insured. However, the insured who may be excluded is not only
the owner or a named insured, but also "any insured under the
'5 4
policy.
It is not unusual for the "named insured" to include the principal
insured, his spouse, and any relatives residing in the same household. 5
Furthermore, the exclusion may extend to a son or
daughter who has "bodily presence," 55 and possibly also to the
agent of the insured. 57 In situations in which the owner allows
his spouse, children, or even agent to use the car, the driver is without the protection the owner-passenger statute was intended to provide. In other words, even though a spouse or a child is excluded
from the owner's and their own insurance liability policy, they may
recover from a negligent driver who is no longer protected by the
owner-passenger statute.
The owner-passenger statute, therefore, fails to include those
individuals who are necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stat53.

CAL. VEn. CODE § 17158 (West Supp. 1976).
54. CAL. INs. CODE § 11580.1(c) (West Supp. 1976).

55. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193,
207, 514 P.2d 953, 963, 110 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1973)

(the named insured, his

spouse, and any relatives residing in the same household); Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Brown, 252 Cal. App. 2d 120, 121, 60 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1967) (the
named insured and his spouse); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Frederick, 244 Cal.
App. 2d 776, 779, 53 Cal. Rptr. 457, 459 (1966) (the named insured and his
relatives).
56. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 52 Cal. App. 3d
534, 539, 125 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142 (1975). Insured's 19-year-old daughter
occasionally spent the night in her family home, spoke with one of her
parents everyday, ran errands for her parents, and borrowed the family
car. She was regarded as a family member and thus within the terms of
the policy.
57. See Otter v. General Ins. Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 940, 951, 109 Cal. Rptr.
831, 838 (1973).

ute. As noted earlier, this necessary-individual test was used in
Brown.5 8 By not including the other individuals necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose, the legislature unreasonably singled
out owner-passengers from other automobile passengers.
Owner's Ability to Select and Control the Driver as a Rationale
Because Justice Sullivan's reliance on Insurance Code section
11580.1 apparently fails, his holding must rest on the distinction
that an owner-passenger has a greater ability than a nonownerpassenger to choose, direct, and control the driver. Justice Sullivan
used as a rationale for his opinion Patton v. La Bree, 0 which had
upheld the constitutionality of the 1961 amendment. He then maintained that Patton explains the underlying basis for the amendment, 60 which gave owner-passengers the same status as nonowner
automobile guests. Justice Sullivan explained that the language
in the 1961 amendment was identical to that in the 1973 reenactment and that therefore Patton should also control the interpretation of the 1973 reenactment. Regardless of whether the reliance
on the identical language of the two statutes is sound, the 1961
amendment should control because the accident in Schwalbe took
place in 1967, before the reenactment of the owner-passenger statute. Consequently the Patton rationale, if correct, should control.
The Patton court reasoned that the relationship between the
driver and the owner-passenger is different because the owner has
the ability to choose, direct, and control his driver.6 ' Justice Sullivan interpreted Patton to mean that the legislature believed it
was unfair to allow an owner-passenger to recover when he had
the power to manage and supervise the driver. 62
However, reliance on the ability to direct and control as an
inherent attribute of ownership is questionable. Does this attribute
apply only to "ownership?16

3

Although the owner-passenger stat-

ute denies protection to the owner, it does not withhold protection
58. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
59. 60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d 398, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1963).
60. See note 52 supra.
61. 60 Cal. 2d at 609, 387 P.2d at 400, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 624, as cited in
Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 519, 546 P.2d 1033, 1036, 128 Cal. Rptr.
321, 324 (1976).
62. 16 Cal. 3d at 520, 546 P.2d at 1036, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
63. See, e.g., Graf v. Harvey, 79 Cal. App. 2d 64, 179 P.2d 348 (1947),
in which a son had bought a car and was legal holder. The father was
given possession of the car while the son was in the armed forces. Although the father used and possessed the car, he was not the owner for
liability purposes.
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from any other person who has possession of the car and is able
to select and direct the driver. For example, in Whitehill v. Strickland,6 4 a husband allowed his wife to use his car. The wife
in turn allowed a friend to drive. The court held that although
the car was used for family purposes, the wife was not the owner
and therefore was not barred from recovery when she was injured
as a result of the driver's negligence.6 5
Today many people lease rather than buy cars. In such a situation a leaseholder has possession and control of the vehicle for an
extended period of time and has the ability to direct and control
the driver. Nevertheless, under the owner-passenger statute the
leaseholder would not be precluded from recovery because he does
not own the car. 6
An owner may, for a number of reasons, allow his car to be used
by another. In some cases the permittee may have possession of
the car with the ability to supervise and control the driver. For
instance, an automobile sales company may permit a prospective
buyer to take out a car to test drive. If the customer allows his
spouse to drive the car, the customer will be in a position to direct
and control the spouse.6 7 Similarly, an individual may rent a car
which may be used for a long trip in which the driving is shared
by different drivers. The individual who rented the car has the
same opportunity as an owner to select, direct, and control drivers.6 8
Additionally, the ability to direct and control a driver may actually be insignificant or even nonexistent. As the dissent pointed out
in Schwalbe, modern high-speed freeways and complicated highways impair any ability to control a driver. In fact, interference
64. 256 Cal. App. 2d 841, 64 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1967).
65. The case was brought by the husband as a wrongful death action.
66. See generally Metz v. Universal Underwriters, Inc., 10 Cal. 3d 45, 513
P.2d 922, 109 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1973). Cf. Klein v. Leatherman, 270 Cal. App.
2d 792, 76 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1969), in which the lessee agreed to pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to the value of the leased truck
with the option to buy. The court held that the lease was actually a conditional contract and that therefore the lessee was in fact an owner.
67. See, e.g., Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Cal. 2d 64, 77 P.2d
1059 (1938). The owner was a sales agency, and the operator was a prospective purchaser who conceded that at his request he had been given permission to use the car for purposes of demonstrating it to members of his
family prior to a decision about purchasing a similar model.
68. See, e.g., Financial Indem. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 226 Cal. App. 2d 689,
38 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1964).

may aggravate the situation or may cause an accident.0 9 Finally,
Justice Sullivan overlooked the fact that an owner-passenger may
be physically handicapped, unlicensed, or unknowledgeable about
driving. In any of these situations, the owner-passenger would be
unable to direct or control the driver.
Justice Sullivan's disregard of these logical inconsistencies renders untenable his distinction between the owner-passenger's and
nonowner-passenger's ability to direct and control the driver. Even
cursory attention to the considerations outlined above indicates that
the ability to direct and control a driver cannot be equated with
the issue of whether the passenger owns the car.
Strict Application of the Owner-Passenger Statute
The court in Schwalbe has expanded the contours of the ownerpassenger statute. Most California courts have required that the
guest statute be strictly construed, 70 primarily because otherwise
the common law right to redress for injuries wrongfully inflicted
is lessened. The guest statute should be allowed as a defense only
71
if the case clearly appears to be within the confines of the statute.
In accord with the treatment previously given the guest statute, the
owner-passenger statute should be strictly interpreted, for the
latter was derived from the former and is likewise contrary to the
common law right of redress.
Previously, California courts had narrowly applied the requirements of the old guest statute.1

2

In Boyd v. Cress,7 3 for example,

a driver pulled his car to the side of the road, and his passenger
got out. The passenger had left the door open, and the car suddenly
rolled. The open door knocked the passenger down, causing her
injuries. The California Supreme Court held that the passenger
was not a guest.7 4 The court reasoned that the case was not within
69. 16 Cal. 3d at 534, 546 P.2d at 1047, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (dissenting
opinion).

70. E.g., O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 997, 429 P.2d 160, 162,
59 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (1967); Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 93, 98 P.2d
729, 731 (1940); Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 254, 44 P.2d 478, 483
(1935).
71. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Hill, 315 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963); Truitt v. Gains,
199 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1961); Hoffman v. Davis, 239 Ark. 99, 387 S.W.2d
338 (1965); Berne v. Peterson, 113 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1959); Davidson
v. Pugh, 1 Ill. App. 670, 274 N.E.2d 205 (1971).
72. See note 14 supra.
73. 46 Cal 2d 164, 293 P.2d 37 (1956).
74. See also Harrison v. Gamatero, 52 Cal. App. 2d 178, 125 P.2d 904
(1942), in which defendant-driver double-parked, and plaintiff-passenger
crossed the street to mail a letter. The plaintiff was hit by another car
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the guest statute because the plaintiff-passenger was neither in nor
upon the car and because the injury did not occur during the

ride.7 5 In reasoning consistent with Boyd, the supreme court in
Smith v. Pope70 held that a passenger who had one foot on the
ground and one foot on the vehicle's running board had not been
"in any vehicle" as the guest statute required. In O'Donnell
v. Mullaney,7 7 the California Supreme Court strictly construed the

"on the highway" requirement of the original guest statute. The
court held that an injured passenger was not barred by the guest
statute when the injury occurred on a private road. The O'Donnell
court also recognized that the relationship between the driver and
the passenger of a motor vehicle may change during the course of
78
a single trip.
What becomes evident from cases like Boyd, Smith, and O'Donnell79 is the failure by the courts to apply the rationales for and
purposes of the guest statute. In gray-area situations in which the
facts do not fall within the letter of the guest statute, the courts
simply applied the strict letter of the guest statute instead of determining whether ingratitude or collusion existed. The courts appeared more concerned with relieving the harshness of the guest
statute. 80
Following such precedents, the Schwalbe court should have
rejected the defendant's claim that the owner-passenger statute
precluded the plaintiffs' cause of action. The statute applies to an
owner "riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven
by another person."'' s The conjunction and implies that the owner
as she crossed the street, returning to defendant's car. The court held that
the plaintiff was not a guest because she was not in the car at the time
of the accident.
75. 46 Cal. 2d at 167-68, 293 P.2d at 39. The court further reasoned that
if the legislature had intended to include as guests those individuals in the
plaintiff's situation, the legislature would have used such language as, "during such ride," or "inany vehicle." Id. at 168, 293 P.2d at 39.
76. 53 Cal. App. 2d 43, 127 P.2d 292 (1943).
77. 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1967).
78. Id. at 998, 429 P.2d at 431, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
79. See note 74 supra.
80. One writer has described these decisions as a judicial nullification
of the guest statute. Comment, Guest Statutes--Judicial Nullification, 41
So. CAL. L. REV. 884 (1968). But see Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 880
n.20, 506 P.2d 212, 220 n.20, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 406 n.20 (1968).
81. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).

must be riding in a vehicle that is being driven by another. 82 Certainly Justice Sullivan's rationale for the owner-passenger statute
requires that the owner-passenger ride in the same vehicle as the
driver. Otherwise, how would the owner direct and control the
driver? Indeed, Schwalbe should stand on better ground for nonapplication of the owner-passenger statute than do those cases in
which the guest statute was strictly applied.
In guest statute cases the danger of ingratitude and collusion is
not lessened by the fact that the vehicle is on a private road rather
than a public highway; 83 neither is it lessened when the passenger
leaves the car for a few minutes to mail a letter and is injured
by a passing car as a result of the driver's negligent parking.8 4
Yet in these situations and others 5 the court has rejected the guest
statute defense. In Schwalbe, however, no opportunity existed for
the owner-passenger to direct and control her driver because she
was in a different car at the time of the accident.8 0 Even if collusion was seen as a rationale for the owner-passenger statute, in
Schwalbe the owner-passenger died, and collusion after the accident
could not rationally have been claimed to be present.
Also in Schwalbe, there was no need to protect the driver's insurance company from the owner-passenger's suit-protection which
Justice Sullivan saw as a purpose for the owner-passenger statute.
The owner and driver in Schwalbe were married, and a driver's
automobile liability policy usually excludes recovery on the policy
to an insured.8 7 The policy usually includes as an insured the
policy holder's spouse.88 The driver's insurance company would
not have had to pay the owner-passenger's recovery had she won
because under the husband's policy she was excluded.8 0 Thus, the
82. The word and is used in logic as a sentential or propositional connec-

tive that produces a compound proposition true only if both compounds are
true. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARlY 112 (4th ed. 1968). When the California Supreme Court first heard Schwalbe v. Jones, the court stated in a
footnote that the plaintiff did not put into issue the fact that the decedent
was towed, thus conceding that the towed and towing cars constituted one
vehicle. 14 Cal. 3d 448 (opinion omitted), 534 P.2d at 75 n.4, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 587 n.4.
83. See note 77 supra.
84. See Harrison v. Gamatero, 52 Cal. App. 2d 178, 125 P.2d 904 (1942).
85. See case cited note 74 supra.
86. 16 Cal. 3d at 517, 546 P.2d at 1034, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
87. See generally id. at 521, 546 P.2d at 1037, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 325 and
cases cited therein.

88. See cases cited note 55 supra.

89. See California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Warwick, 17 Cal.
3d 190, 550 P.2d 1051, 130 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976), in which the California
Supreme Court held that the insurer was not required to indemnify the hus-
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Schwalbe court was presented with a distinctive factual situation
which easily could have allowed the court to dispose of the case
on its facts. The court, however, ignored the usual inclination of
courts to decide difficult cases on their facts.
AN ALTERNATIVE RATIONALE

The majority in Schwalbe failed to recognize an alternative and
perhaps more logical explanation for the owner-passenger statute.
Had it done so, and had it also considered the underlying purposes
of the financial responsibility and civil liability provisions of the
Vehicle Code, the court could have come to a different decision.
The Owner-PassengerStatute
The owner-passenger provision was originally added to the guest
statute in 1961 to solve "one of the knotty little problems involving
petty and otherwise inconsequential points of law: Can an owner
of the car be a guest in it when someone else is driving?" 90 The

issue is neither unique to California 9' nor resolved completely
today.9 2 Most jurisdictions have held that an owner is not a guest
93
in his own car.
Prior to the 1961 amendment to the guest statute, the view in
California on the status of an owner-passenger was unsettled. In
band for injuries suffered by his wife while she was riding as a passenger
in the insured's vehicle. Under the terms of the husband's policy, the husband and wife were both "an insured" and therefore excluded.
90. P OSSER, supra note 10, at § 34, at 187.
91. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 312 (1959).
92. E.g., Summers v. Summers, 40 Ill. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795 (1968),
which held that an owner-passenger is not a guest within the meaning of
the Illinois guest statute. The owner-passenger's status is not changed by
the fact the owner permitted the guest to drive.
93. E.g., Baldwin v. Hill, 215 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963); Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 A. 379 (1936); Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho
523, 373 P.2d 925 (1962); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 7 Misc. 2d 1057, 165 N.Y.S.2d
395 (1957), affirmed, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959); Henline
v. Wilson, 111 Ohio App. 515, 174 N.E.2d 122 (1960); Lorch v. Eglin, 369
Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952); Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114 S.E.2d 732
(1960). The rationale underlying these decisions is that the host relationship is dependent in large measure upon the host's furnishing hospitality
to the guest. Because the owner-passenger is the one extending the hospitality-furnishing the mode of transportation-to the driver, the owner-passenger is the host, and the driver, the guest.

Ray v. Hanisch,9" the court stated that the mere fact the owner
was riding in her own car while it was driven by another did not
render her a guest.9 5 Yet, the court held as a matter of law that
the arrangement between the parties did not constitute giving compensation and that therefore the plaintiff was a guest and could
not recover.9 6 Three years later, in AhIgren v. Ahlgren,97 the
California Supreme Court held that the owner-passenger was not
a guest under the guest statute.9 8 The court reasoned that the
owner has a right to become an occupant of his own car anytime
he wants and has the privilege of inviting his passengers. The nonowner has neither of these prerogatives.
Within the context of the semantic morass created by cases such
as Ray and AhIgren, the guest statute was amended to accord the
owner-passenger the same status attributed to nonowner-passengers. 99 Now, because the guest statute has been ruled unconstitutional, 10 0 the classification of owner-passenger no longer meets the
legislative purpose of equating owner- and nonowner-passengers.
Rather, owner-passengers are singled out for discriminatory treatment.
There is no apparent indication of the legislature's motive in
reenacting the owner-passenger statute. Legislative history is
scarce. 10 1 However, the legislature frequently repeals parts of
94. 147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (1957).
95. Id. at 748, 306 P.2d at 34.
96. Id. at 748-50, 306 P.2d at 34-35. The complaint contained two different counts. The first alleged that the defendant-driver negligently drove
the automobile into a ditch, injuring the plaintiff-owner. In the second
count the plaintiff stated that she had given compensation for the ride by
sharing expenses. The defendant filed a general demurrer. The court held
that the second count did not state a cause of action. The court then reasoned that because the second count pleaded facts upon which the plaintiff
relied, the first count had to be considered in connection with the facts
averred in the second count and with the facts agreed to. Therefore the
first count had to stand or fall with the second count and was thus subject
to demurrer.
97. 185 Cal. App. 2d 216, 8 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1960). The plaintiff-owner
and defendant-driver had been to an office party. The owner requested
the defendant to take him home because the defendant was sober and the
owner had been drinking.
98. Id. at 224-25, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
99. See note 14 supra.
100. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
101. The first time the bill (AB 1094) was proposed by its sponsor Assemblyman Z'berg, section 17158 was totally repealed (April 5, 1973). Subsequently the bill was amended in the Judiciary Committee and passed by
the Assembly. The bill failed passage in the first senate committee hearing
but passed in a second hearing. CA. LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY
1973-1974, at 651.
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statutes held unconstitutional and leaves standing those parts not
10 2
within the court's holding.
The Financial Responsibility and Civil Liability Provisions in the
Vehicle Code
The majority in Schwalbe failed to note the purposes behind the
legislative enactments found in the Vehicle Code's financial responsibility 0 3 and civil liability' 04 provisions. Every California driver
must maintain a statutory level of financial responsibility. 10 5 The
legislative purpose behind this mandate is to protect users of the
highway' 0 6 by assuring that owners of motor vehicles have a certain financial responsibility to those injured by the vehicle operations. 10 7 Furthermore, the legislature assures liability insurance,
102. E.g., Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496
P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). (The court held Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6060 (a) (West 1974) unconstitutional, and the legislature repealed that
section. Act of Dec. 22, 1972, ch. 1285, § 4.3, 1972 Cal. Stats. 2559 (current
version at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060 (West Supp. 1976)). Randone
v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). (The
court held CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 537 (West 1971) unconstitutional, and the
legislature repealed the unconstitutional provision. Act of Sept. 27, 1974,
ch. 1516, § 12, 1974 Cal. Stats. 3377 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 537 (West Supp. 1976)). Blair v. Pitches, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242,
(The court held CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 509-21
96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1970).
(West 1954) unconstitutional, and the legislature repealed those provisions.
Act of Sept. 17, 1973, ch. 526, § 1, 1973 Cal. State. 1013).
103. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16000-480 (West Supp. 1976).
104. Id. §§ 17150-154.
105. Id. § 16020 (West 1971). The forms are listed in CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 16021 (West Supp. 1976), which provides:
Financial responsibility of the driver or owner is established if the
driver or owner of the vehicle involved in an accident described
in section 16000 is:
(a) A self-insured under the provisions of this division.
(b) An insured or obligee under a form of insurance or bond which
complies with the requirements of this division.
(c) The United States of America, this state, any municipality or
subdivision thereof, or lawful agent thereof.
(d) A depositor in, compliance with subdivision (a) of section
16054.2.
(e) In compliance with the requirements authorized by the department by any other manner which effectuates the purpose
of this chapter.
106. See, e.g., Inter-Insurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142,
154, 373 P.2d 640, 646, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598 (1962); Continental Cas. Co.
v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 434, 296 P.2d 801, 808'(1956).
107. See, e.g., Berrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659,

though at a high rate, for any automobile owner whose coverage
has been cancelled by his insurance carrier. 0 8 Additionally, all
automobile policies must include coverage for anyone who drives
the owner's vehicle with the owner's permission.'
These latter
provisions "reflect the legislative purpose to broaden insurance coverage to protect those injured by the negligence of any person driving with the owner's consent." 110 Clearly by these enactments
the legislature has shown its interest in protecting anyone injured
by the negligent use of an automobile.
If the decedent in Schwalbe had been hit by a car while she was
walking on the street, she could have recovered from the negligent
driver. Why then should the decedent have been denied recovery
because she was riding in her own car as a passenger? Justice Sullivan failed to support his argument that the legislature believed
that allowing the owner-passenger to recover from the driver would
be unfair. The purpose of the financial responsibility laws requiring all drivers to have insurance is to assure that all injuries caused
by a negligent driver be compensated.
The Vehicle Code also sets out the responsibility between an
agent-driver and principal-owner. Section 17150 of the Vehicle
Code makes the owner of the automobile financially responsible for
death or injury resulting from negligent conduct by anyone driving
with the owner's permission. The legislative purpose of section
17150 was to protect innocent parties from the negligent use of automobiles. However, "this protection should be paramount to the
rights of an [injured] owner who has permitted the use of his car
by others.""' As a further protection for the owner, section
17153 of the Vehicle Code allows the owner to be subrogated to
all the rights of the person injured. Although the liability imposed
by section 17150 upon the owner is primary and direct in so far
670-71, 456 P.2d 674, 682-83, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114-15 (1969), citing Wildman
v. Government Employers' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 307 P.2d 359, 364
(1957).
108. CAL. INS. CODE § 11620 (West 1972). The assigned risk plan is accomplished by requiring all insurance companies writing liability policies
to accept a share of the assigned risk.
109. CAL. VEH. CODE § 16451 (West 1971).
110. Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, 242 Cal. App. 2d
774, 782, 51 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (1966); Bohrn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504, 38 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (1964).
111. Mason v. Russel, 158 Cal. App. 2d 391, 393, 322 P.2d 486, 487 (1958),
citing Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. 2d 320, 323, 158 P.2d 393, 394 (1945). In
Mason the court held that the plaintiff-car owner could recover from the
negligent permittee-driver who had hit the plaintiff with his car while driving.
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as the injured party is concerned, secondary liability is imposed between the owner and driver.11 2 Indeed, the intent of sections
17150, 17151,113 17152,"1 and 17153 is clearly to place liability
15
on the driver of the car.
This responsibility between agent-driver and principal is the same
when analyzed under general agency considerations. When an
owner is riding as a passenger, the driver will in most cases be
his agent." 6 Under general agency law an agent is liable for his
own acts." 7 This liability is actionable regardless of whether the
principal is liable or amenable to judicial action." 8
Although a
principal is liable for negligent acts committed by his agent within
the scope of the agent's authority," 9 the agent has a duty to use
reasonable skill and diligence. Furthermore, an agent must indemnify his principal for any loss suffered by the principal as a
result of the agent's negligence. 20 Therefore, though an ownerpassenger may not recover on a liability policy for his own negligent acts, there is no reason the owner-passenger should not be able
to recover from his negligent driver.
Schwalbe

AND CALIFORNIA TORT POLICY

The injured owner-passenger's right to recovery is supported by
112. Heves v. Kershaw, 198 Cal. App. 2d 340, 344, 17 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839
(1961), citing Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 256, 261,
44 P.2d 430, 432 (1935).
113. This statute protects the owner from being held liable for those
damages intended to punish the driver-that is, punitive damages.
114. This statute requires that in any action against the owner for the
negligence of the driver, the driver must be made a party defendant.
115. Heves v. Kershaw, 198 Cal. App. 2d 340, 344, 17 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839
(1961).
116. An agent is a person who has undertaken to act for another and
to be controlled by the other in so acting. W. SEAvEY, AGENCY § 3, at 4
(1964).
117. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2343(3) (West 1954).
118. E.g., James v. Marinship, 25 Cal. 2d 721, 742-43, 155 P.2d 329, 341
(1945); Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 309, 320, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49, 56
(1965).
119. E.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 663, 109
Cal. Rptr. 269, 275 (1973).
120. E.g., Poile v. Stockton Merchants Ass'n, 176 Cal. App. 2d 100, 104,
1 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286 (1959); Leland v. Oliver, 82 Cal. App. 474, 479, 255
P. 775, 777 (1927).

California's liberal tort laws. The remainder of this Comment will
discuss Schwalbe in light of the policy goals of California tort law.
California's system of tort law is guided by a policy goal of
1
increasing the incidence of compensation for accidental injury.''
This goal can best be accomplished by "loss spreading through the
conduit of liability insurance.' 122 Automobile liability insurance,
for example, spreads risks among the entire class of automobile
insurance buyers. The result of broadening liability is to increase the likelihood that people will buy insurance. 123 This
result is consistent with the purpose of the financial responsibility
laws.

12 4

Nevertheless, California tort law is built on a fault-based foundation. Although other jurisdictions have adopted no-fault automobile compensation systems, 125 California has rejected them. Li
v. Yellow Cab Co.' 26 confirmed the California position that "in
a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault
27
should govern the extent of liability."'
Schwalbe is incongruent with California's policy of increasing the
incidence of compensation on a fault basis. Both of these elements
will be independently considered with Schwalbe.
Increased Incidence of Compensation as a Policy Goal
Expanded judicial concepts of "reasonable care" and "duty"
account for more frequent compensation awards. Both a statute 2 8 and judicial precedents' 2 9 require that all people in California use ordinary care to protect others from being injured. In
121. Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort Reform: The Guest Statute
Exemplar and a Proposal for Comparative Negligence, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1566, 1566 (1973).
122. Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last by Judicial
Choice, 64

CALiF.

L. Rnv. 239, 242 (1976).

123. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944).
124. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16000-480 (West Supp. 1976).
125. For a list of those states which have both comparative negligence
systems and no-fault coverage, see Fleming, supra note 122, at 240 n.3.
Several commentators have proposed that California adopt a no-fault
system for auto accidents. E.g., Cohen, Fault and The Auto Accident: The
Lost Issue in California,12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 164 (1964); Sulnick, Tort Law:
Political Perspective,7 LOYOLA L. Rzv. 410 (1974).
126. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
127. Id. at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
128. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714 (West 1971).
129. E.g., Kopfinger v. Grand Central Pub. Mkt., 60 Cal. 2d 852, 857, 389
P.2d 529, 532, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (1964); Varus v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 261, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737, 746 (1962).
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a landmark case, Rowland v. Christian,130 the California Supreme
Court declared Civil Code section 1714 the fundamental rule of
negligence liability in California, even though the court could have
decided the case in a number of ways without abandoning the
old distinctions among entrants upon land.131 Furthermore, later
decisions have also explicitly or implicitly recognized section 1714
32
as the general principle for negligence liability in California.'
As a result California has rejected the plaintiff's status as a bar
to compensation for injury.
In their move toward more frequently granting compensation to
injured plaintiffs, courts have refused to succumb to arguments
that collusion may result if recovery is granted to particular plaintiffs. Consequently, inter-spousal immunity,'3 3 intra-family immunity,'3

4

and parental immunity'135 have been rejected in favor of

increasing the incidence of compensation. "The possibility that
fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases does
not justify wholesale rejection of an entire class of claims in which
that potential arises." '

36

130. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). Previous distinctions had been drawn among trespassers, social invitees, and business
invitees. Each classification required a different standard of care owed by
land occupiers to the entrant onto the land.
131. For example, if the plaintiff in Rowland had proved that the crack
in the bathroom faucet handle which caused the injury was a concealed
trap, defendant would have been liable because she failed to warn the
plaintiff. Alternatively, the court could have decided that the occupier
owed a general duty of care to only certain people in the licensee category
-the social guests-by including social guests in the invitee category or
by forming a separate category for social guests. Ohio adopted the latter
approach in Scheiber v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 120 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
132. E.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551
P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) (holding that a psychologist has
a duty to warn a third person whom a patient plans to kill when the patient
discloses this plan to the psychologist); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adopting comparative negligence); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388

(1973) (holding the automobile guest statute unconstitutional); Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972)

(holding landlord liable for electrocution of decedent); Holliday v. Miles,
Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 396, 72 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1968) (holding supplier of chattel liable for negligence which resulted in injury to user).
133. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).

134. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal Rptr. 102 (1962).
135. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971).
136. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72,77-78 (1969).

I

Traditionally, the first step in finding liability was inquiry into

13 7
whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care.

Limits were placed on liability according to the doctrine of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,138 which excludes recovery by those
outside a foreseeable zone of danger. 1 9 Legal duty existed only
if the court or legislature said a "duty" existed, and this determination did not depend solely on the foreseeability of harm. 140
In Dillon v. Legg,' 41 however, the California Supreme Court pos-

tulated "duty" within terms of foreseeability.

For the case to go

to the jury, the court must first decide what the ordinary person
under such circumstances should have reasonably foreseen. Then
in light of that duty the court will determine whether the accident
and harm were reasonably foreseeable. 14 2 Dillon and Rowland
relegated duty determination and its policy factors to a secondary
role. 43 Therefore, in California the defendant now owes a duty of
care to all people foreseeably endangered by his conduct in respect
to all risks which make that conduct unreasonable. 44 The impact
137. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 307, 379
P.2d 513, 520, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40 (1963); Cohen v. Eleanor Coon Groman
Mortuary, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (1964); Stromber
v. Yuba City, 225 Cal. App. 2d 286, 289, 37 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (1964);
Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 63, 271 P.2d 23, 25 (1954).
[Dluty [is] . . .the problem of the relation between individuals
which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the
other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the obligation .... "[D]uty" is
a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of the particular plaintiff ....
PROSSER, supra note 10 § 53, at 324.
138. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
139. B.E. WITKEN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 489, at 2750
(8th ed. 1974).

140. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 307, 379
P.2d 513, 521, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41 (1963).
141. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1969), in which the
court awarded damages to a mother for mental injuries suffered as a result
of witnessing the defendant run her daughter down with his car.
142. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
143. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 45, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 216, 221 (1975).
144. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399 525 P.2d
669, 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974).

Compare Biakanja v. Irving, 49

Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958), in which the court said:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct, and the injury suffered, the
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of Dillon was to offer a wider range of compensation to an injured
plaintiff who is neither in contractual nor physical privity with the
tortfeasor. 145 For example, a duty of care toward a third person
has been imposed on a therapeutic psychologist whose patient revealed to him a desire to kill the third party. 14 6 Similarly, in an
action for damages resulting from injuries negligently inflicted on
her husband, plaintiff wife had a cause of action against the tortfeasor for loss of consortium. The risk of such a loss was sufficiently foreseeable to give rise to a duty of care toward her.147 Furthermore, a direct duty was owed to the decedent by the employer of
1 48
the tortfeasor who killed the decedent.
Another approach taken by California courts in order to grant
more frequent compensation to injured plaintiffs has been to apply
what one commentator calls a "status approach"' 149 to determine
the defendant's duty toward the plaintiff. The approach looks
squarely at the defendant, as opposed to the traditional view of examining the particular relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant.5 0 This approach seems to be more useful when the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and the policy
of preventing future harm.
145. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 42-43, 123
Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (1975).
146. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
147. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
148. Van Oosting v. Duber Indus. Security Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1976)
(withdrawn from publication by order of the court). (The defendant employer had a legal duty toward the plaintiff who was killed by defendant's
employee. The court held that such harm was foreseeable under the circumstances. The employer had allowed his employee, who was a security
guard, to return to his place of employment five and one-half hours after
the employee had finished his work. Although the employee was drunk,
he was allowed to take his gun from his locker. He then returned to the
bar where he had previously had an argument with the decedent and shot
the decedent.).
149. Rintala, Forward: Status Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58

CALIF.

L. REV. 80 (1969).
150. See Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d
674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969), in which the court focused on the character
of the defendant. The court found that the defendant was involved in a
commercial business (insurance company) with large public dealings and
examined the expectation of the public and the type of service which the
entity holds itself out as ready to offer. The duty of the insurance company
passed primarily to the general public or more precisely to the class of third

defendant is a large commercial manufacturer or corporation.
However, arguably having the status of "a driver" is determinative
of liability. If this argument is accepted, the court would then determine whether the driver should, as an incident of engaging in
driving, assume an obligation to exercise reasonable care to avoid
creating risk of injury. The court would first look at the driver,
who is required to have insurance, and determine his financial
capacity to bear the costs of the injuries. 15' Second, the court
would examine the public expectation with respect to how a prudent motorist should drive. Certainly the policies underlying the
financial responsibility provisions of the Vehicle Code would favor
152
this approach.
persons who will be injured through accidents involving the insured's automobile. The court found that the duty was independent from a singular
duty enforced by the named insured. Similarly, in Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), the California Supreme Court unanimously upheld an injured bystander's claim for
damages caused by a defect in the user's car. The court rejected the concepts that privity must exist and that foreseeability of a defective product
causing injury to one category of victims as compared to another must be
found. Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 88, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 656. The Elmore court
relied on the policies set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), and Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), which focused
upon the role of the defendant manufacturer and/or retailer in the process
culminating in injury to the plaintiff from the defective product as well
as on the defendant's ability to absorb and spread the costs of the injuries.
151. CAL. Evin. Conx § 1155 (West 1966) provides: "Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or
partially against loss arising from liability for that harm is inadmissible
to prove negligence or other wrongdoing." But as one commentator points
out:
Under the pressure of the enactment of more and more stringent
financial responsibility laws, the practice of securing insurance
protection against liability is rapidly becoming almost universal
.... When the rule against the disclosure of insurance originated
doubtless the existence of such protection for defendants was exceptional ....

But when we consider the ways in which the fact

of insurance may be properly disclosed in evidence or suggested
at the beginning of the trial upon the examination of jurors, and
the fact that insurance has become usual rather than exceptional,
it seems likely today that in nearly all cases the jury will either
be informed of the fact of insurance or will consciously assume
that the defendant is so protected.

C. McCoRmiCK, EviDENcE § 201, at 481 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).

152. However, some cases may indicate a policy objective to protect
plaintiffs who are in an unequal bargaining position or who in fact have
no opportunity to bargain. E.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.
2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), in which the court stated:
"Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunities to inspect for defects
and to limit their purchases . . .whereas the bystander ordinarily has no

such opportunity. In short, the bystander is in greater need of protection."
Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657. If this is the rationale of
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Schwalbe runs directly counter to the California trend favoring
increased incidence of compensation for the injured plaintiff. By
protecting the negligent driver, the owner-passenger statute ignores
the trend toward risk-spreading through insurance. Schwalbe
upheld a statute requiring only a slight duty of care by the driver
toward his owner-passenger, when at the same time California
courts have imposed a duty of care on defendants toward third parties who are in neither contractual nor physical privity. Most importantly, while California requires everyone to use reasonable care
toward others, the owner-passenger statute allows a single class of
people to refrain only from willful misconduct.
California'sFault-BasedTort System
153
In Li v. Yellow Cab
California tort law is based on fault.
154
Co.,
the California Supreme Court adopted the theory of comThe court concluded that contributory
parative negligence. "' 5
negligence ought to be replaced by a more equitable rule which
assesses liability in proportion to fault.156 Of course, the logical
corollary of a fault principle is a rule of comparative or proportional negligence.15 7 Indeed, the most equitable result that a

such cases, they would not support an argument for granting compensation
to an owner-passenger because seemingly the owner-passenger is able to
choose his driver. However, as noted earlier, once on the road the
owner-passenger has little ability to control and direct how the driver actually drives and may be viewed as in a situation similar to that of a bystander.
153. Prosser defines fault as
[a] failure to live up to an ideal standard of conduct which may
be beyond the knowledge or capacity of the individual and in acts
which are normal and usual in the community and without moral
reproach in its eyes. It will impose liability for good intentions
and for innocent mistakes ....

In

the legal sense, "fault" has

come to mean no more than a departure from the conduct required
of a man by society for the protection of others and it is the public
and social interest which determines what is required."
PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 4, at 18.
154. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
155. Comparative negligence is the apportionment of damages according
to the fault of all parties involved. Under contributory negligence any unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff totally bars the plaintiff from recovering from the defendant. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 67, at 433.
156. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1975).
157. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.3, at 1207 (1956).

court can reach is the equation of liability with fault.15
The
court adopted a pure form of comparative negligence in preference
to the modified form. 5 9 Under the pure form plaintiff's damages
are reduced by the trier of fact in proportion to the amount of
fault attributable to him. Under the modified form, if the plaintiff is found to be more than fifty percent at fault, the plaintiff
is barred from recovery.' 0 The pure form was adopted because
the Li court believed that damages should be apportioned in accordance with fault regardless of whether the plaintiff is more than
161
fifty percent at fault.
The owner-passenger statute seriously hampers the general goal
of a comparative negligence system to apportion damages on a fault
basis. Moreover, the statute violates the level of reason and fairness Li sought to obtain,' 6 2 for the owner-passenger statute does
not equate liability with fault. Rather, the statute excuses the
driver's negligence toward his passenger if the passenger also owns
the car. One commentator has suggested that a comparative negligence system should be read as an implied repealer of guest statutes
(owner-passenger statutes) .103 However, this theory has not been
4
followed by any jurisdiction.'1
158. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973). Besides California, Florida is the only jurisdiction to establish comparative negligence
through the courts rather than by the legislature.
159. Only Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972), New York,
N.Y. Civ. PR~c. § 1411.1 (McKinney 1976), and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.

§ 9-20-4 (Supp. 1974), have a pure form comparative negligence.
160. See generally PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 67, at 433-39; ScHWARTZ,
supra note 13, at § 3.2, at 46.
161. 13 Cal. 3d at 827-2&, 532 P.2d at 1242-43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
162. See generally id. at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
163. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at § 10.2, at 179. The following jurisdictions have both guest statutes and comparative negligence systems: Arkansas, Anx. REV. STAT. § 75-913-915 (1957); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-1 (1974); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 3-129.01 (1970) (aircraft guest statute); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.190 (1975) (aircraft guest statute); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-14 (1975) (aircraft guest statute), § 39-1501-03 (1975) (motor vehicle guest statute); Oregon, 1961 OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 30.115 & 30.130 (1975); South Dakota, S.D. COmPLED LAWS ANN. § 3234-1 (1976) (motor vehicle guest statute), § 50-13-15 (1969) (aircraft guest
statute); Texas, TEx. Civ. CODE ANN. tit. 116, §§ 6701 (b) (Vernon 1977);
Utah, UTAIH CODE ANN. § 2-1-33 (1953) (aircraft guest statute), § 41-9-1
LAWS

(1953)

(motor vehicle guest statute); Washington,

WASH.

REV. CODE §

46.08.080 (1976); Wyoming, WYo. STAT. § 31-233 (1967) (motor vehicle guest
statute).
164. But see Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974),
where in a concurring opinion the court suggested that the enactment of
a comparative negligence statute impliedly repealed the Idaho guest statute: "The question .

.

. is .

.

. whether the guest statute and comparative

negligence are sufficiently inconsistent that it must be held that the guest
statute has been superseded by enactment of comparative negligence."
Id. at 26, 523 P.2d at 1372.
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Implementation of comparative negligence raises practical problems in applying the owner-passenger statute's requirement that
willful misconduct be proved, for plaintiff's contributory negligence
is "no defense to an action based on a theory of willful misconduct."01 5 The rationale for this concept was stated in Williams
v. Carr:' 6 "[C]ommentators as well as some courts have criticized the all-or-nothing aspects of the contributory negligence doctrine."'0 7 Furthermore, one effect of Li was the nullification of
the "last clear chance" doctrine. That doctrine was developed as
68
a "modification of the strict rule of contributory negligence"'
and has been equated with gross and willful misconduct. 169
Seemingly, Li would stand for an abdication of the willful misconduct concept. Because the concept was developed to ease the sting
of contributory negligence, the adoption of a comparative negligence system outdates willful misconduct. Regardless of whether
either of the parties to the action acted willfully, the standard used
170
by a jury should be a comparative one.
THE IMPACT OF

Schwalbe

In 1973, in Brown- v. Merlo, the California Supreme Court held
165. Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d 579, 583, 440 P.2d 505, 509, 68 Cal. Rptr.
305, 309 (1968). See cases cited therein.
166. 68 Cal. 2d 579, 440 P.2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968).
167. Id. at 583, 440 P.2d at 509, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
168. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 66, at 427.
169. See Gibbard v. Cursan, 255 Mich. 311, 196 N.W. 398 (1923), in which
the court stated:
In a case where the defendant, who knows, or ought, by the
exercise of ordinary care, to know, of the precedent negligence of
the plaintiff by his subsequent negligence does plaintiff an injury.
Strictly, this is the basis of recovery in all cases of gross negligence. Such gross negligence is also sometimes called discovered
negligence, subsequent negligence, discovered peril, last clear
chance doctrine and the humanitarianrule....,
Id. at 316, 196 N.W. at 401 (emphasis added). See Morris, Gross Negligence
In Michigan-How Gross Is It?, 16 WAYNE L. Rnv. 457, 462 (1970).
170. One court has noted the difficulty the jury might have when comparing willful misconduct in a comparative negligence system. Thompson
v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 26, 523 P.2d 1365, 1372 (1974) (concurring opinion).
There it was pointed out that the jury would first have to decide whether
the driver was guilty of willful misconduct; it would then have to compare
the willful misconduct of the driver with the ordinary negligence of the
guest-passenger and assign degrees of fault to each. Determination of willful misconduct by itself is difficult and confusing but when added to the
comparison that must be made between willful misconduct on the one hand
and ordinary negligence on the other, a meaningful allocation of fault becomes impossible.

the California guest statute unconstitutional. Only three years
later, that same court in Schwalbe v. Jones upheld the constitutionality of the owner-passenger statute. This abrupt rejection of
the Brown rationale may discourage the California Supreme Court
from reversing Schwalbe for some time. One question is whether
other jurisdictions which have not passed on the constitutionality
of their particular guest statutes will be as quick to follow
Schwalbe as some jurisdictions were to follow Brown.17 '
The owner-passenger statute penalizes those prudent owners of
automobiles who, for reasons of safety, turn over the driving to
another person.' 7

2

In those cases in which an owner has been

drinking and requests a sober friend to drive him home' 73 or in
which the owner and a friend share the driving, the owner-passenger becomes an endangered individual.1 74 Furthermore, in cases in
which the owner relinquishes the driving to an automobile serviceman or mechanic, the owner is unprotected against the driver's
ordinary negligence."75
CONCLUSION

Schwalbe in effect erodes the reasonableness which Brown
sought to implement and restores the outdated notion that an automobile confers a mystical status upon its occupants. The ownerpassenger statute involved in Schwalbe suffers from the same inconsistencies as did the old guest statute and may be attacked on
either constitutional or tort policy grounds. The California Supreme
Court's precipitous turn against Brown may indicate that the
owner-passenger statute will have to be legislatively revoked. However, if the legislature fails to act, the California Supreme Court
may still void the statute; indeed, because the legislature is often

171. See note 34 supra.
172. Many guest statute cases involve accidents in which the owner was
driving and persisted in driving despite fatigue or intoxication. E.g., Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d 579, 440 P.2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968); Ching
Yee v. Dy Foon, 143 Cal. App. 2d 129, 299 P.2d 668 (1956); Halstead v. Paul,
129 Cal. App. 2d 339, 277 P.2d 43 (1954); Erickson v. Vogt, 27 Cal. App.
2d 77, 80 P.2d 533 (1938).
173. E.g., Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 185 Cal. App. 2d 216, 8 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1960).
174. See, e.g., Fuller v. Greenup, 267 Cal. App. 2d 10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1968); Williamson v. Fitzgerald, 116 Cal. App. 19, 2 P.2d 201 (1931).

175. E.g., Patton v. La Bree, 60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d 398, 35 Cal. Rptr. 622

(1963).

[VOL. 14: 904, 1977]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

influenced by the powerful insurance lobbies, the court may be the
170
more feasible forum for so doing.

MARK A. BONENFANT

176. Legislatures tend to react to pressures rather than to initiate action
to avoid problems. However, no comprehensive public interest group exists
to press for changes in tort law. Indeed, the legislature is rarely able to
escape the pressures of insurance companies who tend to have their own
idea on what tort law should be. In addition, when a legislature does enact
a statute, it generally fails to cover the various problems that arise in enforcing the statute. See generally notes 121 & 122 supra.

